Greece: Not at a Bifurcation, but on a Foreseen Trajectory

Bifurcation theory is a branch of mathematics, but, it is also a way to describe a point where something will move along one of two paths—a possible way to talk about dilemmas. However, in order to pose a dilemma, the conditions and framework must exist.. If not, we are simply discussing a desire for dilemmas, an obsession with change, or a blunt way to describe incremental and unstable steps of change.

So, where does Greece stand now?

Greece has been officially in a crisis for more than 15 years. Since 2009, when the deficit of the Greek public debt was discovered and the economic salvation process began, until now. But the grim reality is that Greece has not been in a crisis only since then. The cultural, social, and economic processes that led to the collapse of 2009 had been known at least since 1990. When Xenophon Zolotas, one of the chief economists and temporary prime minister of Greece, realized that both Andreas Papandreou and Constantinos Mitsotakis would lead Greece to collapse, it was just the first cry in the woods. Since then, Panagiotis Kondylis analyzed all the pathologies of Greek social, economic, demographic, and geopolitical structure and correctly estimated the sequence of events that would follow. Also, far too many analysts explained the necessity for deep and permanent reforms, which, if done earlier, could have alleviated the consequences of the Greek collapse and the process of recovery and healing.

Still, a big problem remains in Greece: there are no social forces that could reform society. For the last 15 years, the word "reform" has meant great pressure for the average Greek, but not changes in the attitudes and practices of the ruling elite. It is easier to "reform" the ways that the complex landscape of small and medium Greek taxpayers is reached and taxed by the state than to control the cartels that decide the fate of fragile Greek leaderships, which, after all, lack solid parties to support their policies. The narrative goes more or less like this: if the average citizen is taxed properly, the budget deficits will be covered. On the other hand, the major taxpayers, both individuals and companies, while receiving privileged contracts, evading taxes, and benefiting even more from the lack of oversight than the average citizen, are considered to require even less taxation.

In Greece, therefore, while there is a pervasive but undefined sense of the need for change, there is neither a bourgeoisie conscious of its position as a leader nor a middle class aware of its potential to produce leadership and policy. And if this has been a problem in Europe for thirty years, as Castoriadis analyzed in the "Rise of Insignificance," in Greece, it tends to become a dangerous distortion of a society's ability to change in order to survive as it ages.

The future is unclear, but moral examples alone are not enough. If there is a solution, along with the sporadic attempts at partial improvements and the always useful, pervasive sense of the need for change, it is primarily to define the problem and for small groups of intellectuals to seek answers. Answers not only for practical, short-term solutions but also for long-term strategies that take the big picture into account. Until then, the country simply hopes that the way it moves from one problem to another remains sustainable. And, of course, that it remains wonderful, as a relief for the population, the most stressed in Europe right now.